Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1997

State of Utah v. Brandon David Wright : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jan Graham; Attorney General; Attorney for Appellee.
Linda M. Jones; Deborah Kreeck Mendez; Salt Lake Legal Defender Association; Attorneys for
Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Utah v. Wright, No. 970248 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1997).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/831

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 970248-CA
Priority No. 2

BRANDON DAVID WRIGHT,
Defendant/Appellant,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for Aggravated
Robbery, a 1st degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-302 (1995), in the Third Judicial District Court in and
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Timothy R.
Hanson, Judge, presiding.
LINDA M. JONES, #5497
DEBORAH KREECK MENDEZ, #5743
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant
JAN GRAHAM
ATTORNEY GENERAL
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P. O. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854

PEALS
<*- \*\n

Attorney for Appellee

^blHt+LA

JUN 1 1 1997
COURT

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 970248-CA
Priority No. 2

BRANDON DAVID WRIGHT,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a judgment and conviction for Aggravated
Robbery, a 1st degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-302 (1995), in the Third Judicial District Court in and
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Timothy R.
Hanson, Judge, presiding.
LINDA M. JONES, #5497
DEBORAH KREECK MENDEZ, #5743
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC,
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant
JAN GRAHAM
ATTORNEY GENERAL
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor
P. 0. Box 140854
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854
Attorney for Appellee

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

11

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

1

PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT

2

RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

3

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

4

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT MISUNDERSTOOD ITS AUTHORITY TO
REDUCE WRIGHT'S SENTENCE.

5

A. ALTHOUGH THE TRIAL COURT HAS BROAD
DISCRETION WITH RESPECT TO SENTENCING
ISSUES, THE TRIAL COURT IN THIS MATTER
DEEMED IT HAD NO POWER TO REDUCE WRIGHT'S
SENTENCE AS THE PARTIES REQUESTED

5

1. The Broad Discretion Standard
Accommodates a General Balancing of
Factors.

7

2. Utah Appellate Courts Have
Restricted the Interest-of-Justice
Inquiry in Other Contexts. Which in
Turn Restricts the Trial Court's
Exercise of Discretion in the
Challenged Proceeding.

8

B. WRIGHT'S APPEAL DOES NOT IMPLICATE
"PRESERVATION" ISSUES
CONCLUSION

Addendum A:
Addendum B:

12
14

Judgment, Sentence (Commitment)
Text of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (1995)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Anderson v. Public Service Comm'n of Utah, 83 9
P.2d 822 (Utah 1992)

10

Bellon v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089 (Utah 1991)

2

Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789
(Utah 1991)
Ehlers & Ehlers Architects v. Carbon County.

7

805 P.2d 789 (Utah App. 1991)
Jensen v. Morgan, 844 P.2d 287 (Utah 1992)

10
7

State v. Bagshaw, 836 P.2d 1384 (Utah App.
1992)
State v. Bell. 785 P.2d 390 (Utah 1989)
State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878 (Utah 1981)

1, 2, 6
9
5, 13

State v. Bullock. 791 P.2d 155 (Utah 1989),
cert, denied. 493 U.S. 1024 (1990)

13

State v. Casarez. 656 P.2d 1005 (Utah 1982)

10, 11

State v. Harding. 576 P.2d 1284 (Utah 1978)

5, 13

State v. Houk, 906 P.2d 907 (Utah App. 1995)

8

State v. Jones. 657 P.2d 1263 (Utah 1982)

6

State v. Labrum. 925 P. 2d 937 (Utah 1996)
State v. Lipskv. 608 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1980)

13, 14
6, 7, 10,
13

State v. Nelson. 725 P. 2d 1353 (Utah 1986)

9

State v. Powell. 872 P.2d 1027 (Utah 1994)

12

State v. Snvder. 932 P.2d 120 (Utah App. 1997)
ii
State v. Theison. 709 P.2d 307 (Utah
1985)

8, 9
5, 13

Page
Ward v. Richfield Citv. 798 P.2d 757 (Utah
1990)
Zamora v. Draper. 635 P.2d 78 (Utah 1981)

1, 2
9

RULES. STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Utah R. Civ. P. 51 (1997)

7

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-201

6, 13

Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (1995)

1, 2, 3,
5, 6, 13

Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-411 (1995)

8

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1995)

1, 2

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (e) (1996)

iii

1

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
BRANDON DAVID WRIGHT,

Case No. 970248-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant,
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This appeal is from a judgment and conviction for Aggravated
Robbery, a 1st degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
76-6-302 (1995) (a copy of the judgment is attached hereto as
Addendum A ) , in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson,
presiding.

Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to

Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issue presented for review is as follows:
Whether the trial court erred in its interpretation and
application of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (1995), in refusing to
reduce defendant's first degree felony conviction to a second
degree conviction, on the grounds that it lacked the power to
order such a reduction in sentencing.
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

The issue presented on appeal is one of

statutory interpretation, which presents a question of law. State
v. Bacrshaw, 836 P.2d 1384, 1385 (Utah App. 1992) (citing Ward v.
Richfield City, 798 P.2d 757, 759 (Utah 1990)).

Utah appellate

courts review questions of law under a correction of error
standard, without deference to the trial court. Bagshaw, 83 6 P.2d
at 1385; Bellon v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089, 1092 (Utah 1991); Ward,
798 P.2d at 759.
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT
Appellant's issue is preserved in the Record on Appeal
("R.") at 69, 85-97.
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following statute will be determinative of the issue on
appeal:
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (1995). Conviction of lower
degree of offense.
The text of that provision is contained in the attached
Addendum B.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and
Disposition in the Court Below.
In July 1996, the state filed an Information against
Appellant/Defendant Brandon Wright ("Wright") and co-defendant
Ruston Webber, charging them with aggravated robbery, a 1st
degree felony in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1995).
(R. 6-8.)

Thereafter, Wright and the state entered into an

agreement wherein Wright pled guilty to the offense and the state
recommended that the trial court sentence Wright to a second
degree felony, which would reflect a reduction by one degree of
the offense as charged. (R. 39-46; 69; 96.)
The trial court sentenced Wright to a first degree felony
2

(R. 51) on the basis that it did not have discretion to reduce
the sentence, and could only do so if "required by the interests
of justice." (R. 96.)
order.

Wright has appealed from the judgment and

(R. 54-55.)
STATEMENT OF FACTS

In July 1996, Wright and an accomplice, Ruston Webber,
allegedly went to Steven Lee's home for money that Webber represented belonged to him. (R. 76-78.) Upon seeing Lee at home,
Wright allegedly approached him and began striking him in the
head with a metal table leg. (Id.; 90-92.)
Wright was later arrested and charged with aggravated robbery, a first degree felony. (R. 6-8.) He and the state subsequently entered into an agreement wherein Wright pled guilty to
the charge and the state recommended that the trial court
sentence Wright to a second degree felony, which would reflect a
reduction by one degree of the offense. (R. 39-46; 69; 96.)
Thereafter, during the sentencing hearing, counsel for
Wright made a motion to the trial court that the sentence be
reduced by one degree pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402. (R.
84-96.)

The state stipulated on the record to such a reduction

in sentencing. (R. 69; 96.) In considering the imposition of the
reduced sentence, the trial court stated the following:

I believe the standard

that

I'm required

to consider

in

determining whether or not to sentence a person, who has
pled guilty to a first degree to a lesser sentence, that is

a second degree felony, is there is
required
by the interest
of justice.

some basis that
is
And I can't find any

in this case. The reasons that you suggest, Ms. KreeckMendez[, counsel for Wright], are rational reasons, but
that's not the basis in the statute so the motion [to reduce
3

the sentence] is denied.
(R. 96 (emphasis added).)

Thereafter, counsel for Wright essen-

tially stated that "in the interest of justice" Wright entered
into the agreement on the state's recommendation of the reduced
sentence to avoid spending resources on a trial of the matter.
(R. 97.) The trial court continued to deny the request. (R. 97.)
The trial court ordered Wright to be committed to the Utah
State Prison for the term prescribed by law for a first degree
felony, "which, in no case, is less than five years but may be
for as long as the rest of your life."

(R. 97.)

Because the

trial court misconstrued and misapplied the statute, Wright has
appealed from the judgment and asks this Court to remand the case
with instructions to the trial court to exercise its discretion
in determining whether Wright's sentence should be reduced by one
degree, to a second degree felony.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Pursuant to Utah law, the trial court is required to
exercise broad discretion with respect to sentencing issues.

In

this case, the trial court misconstrued its authority in that
context, and ruled that it did not have the power to reduce
Wright's sentence by one degree unless it was "required" to do so
by the "interests of justice."

Because the trial court failed to

recognize that it had the discretion to rule on the matter, it
misapplied the law. This case should be reversed and remanded
with instructions that the trial court exercise its discretion in
ruling on the sentencing issue in this case.
4

ARGUMENT
THE TRIAL COURT MISUNDERSTOOD ITS AUTHORITY TO REDUCE
WRIGHT'S SENTENCE,
A. ALTHOUGH THE TRIAL COURT HAS BROAD DISCRETION WITH
RESPECT TO SENTENCING ISSUES, THE TRIAL COURT IN THIS MATTER
DEEMED IT HAD NO POWER TO REDUCE WRIGHT f S SENTENCE AS THE
PARTIES REQUESTED.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (1995) allows the trial court to
reduce a sentence during the sentencing proceeding by one degree.
It provides in pertinent part the following:
(1) If the court, having regard to the nature and
circumstances of the offense of which the defendant was
found guilty and to the history and character of the
defendant, concludes it would be unduly harsh to record the
conviction as being for that degree of offense established
by statute and to sentence the defendant to an alternative
normally applicable to that offense, the court may unless
otherwise specifically provided by law enter a judgment of
conviction for the next lower degree of offense and impose
sentence accordingly.
•

*

*

(3) An offense may be reduced only one degree under this
section unless the prosecutor specifically agrees in writing
or on the court record that the offense may be reduced two
degrees.
In no case may an offense be reduced under this
section by more than two degrees.
The Utah Supreme Court has long recognized that Section 76-3-402
provides the trial court with discretion during sentencing to
enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower degree of
offense and impose sentence accordingly. See State v. Theison,
709 P.2d 307, 308 n.l. (Utah 1985); State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d
878, 879 (Utah 1981) (trial court reduced sentence in accordance
with its "statutory prerogative"); State v. Harding, 576 P.2d
1284 n.3 (Utah 1978).
[The trial] court in fact has very wide discretion in
sentencing. A court may sentence a defendant to a prison
term, impose a fine, enter judgment
for a lower category
of
5

offense

pursuant

to

§ 76-3-402.

place him on probation,

disqualify him from public or private office pursuant to §
76-3-201, sentence the defendant to serve prison terms
concurrently or consecutively, order the defendant to pay
restitution, or suspend a prison sentence. As pointed out
in the dissent of Justice Wilkins in Reddish v. Smith,

supra, this wide variety
but absolutely
requires,

of alternatives
not only
permits,
the exercise of
discretion.

State v. Lipskv, 608 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Utah 1980) (emphasis
added).
In State v. Jones, 657 P.2d 1263 (Utah 1982), defendant
argued on appeal that the trial court erred in determining it had
no power to reduce a sentence from a felony to a misdemeanor. The
Utah Supreme Court refused to address the issue on the grounds
that defendant failed to provide any reference to the lengthy
record in support of his contention: "[T]he record appears to be
silent on whether the court denied defendant's request for the
reason he claims or on the merits in the exercise of the court's
broad discretion in sentencing matters."

Id. at 1267 n.7.

In State v. Baashaw, 836 P.2d 1384 (Utah App. 1992),
defendant argued the trial court misinterpreted its ability to
reduce a sentence under the 1990 version of Section 76-3-402,
resulting in misapplication of the statute.

The state agreed and

this Court reversed the entry of class A misdemeanors and ordered
that they be further reduced consistent with the applicable
language of Section 76-3-402.
In this case, the trial court misconstrued its power to
reduce a sentence, and misapplied the statute. The trial court
stated that the standard it was "required to consider" was

6

whether there was a basis "required"

by the "interest of justice"

permitting the reduction. The trial court supplanted its
prerogative for a more restrictive standard that replaces the
general balancing made when the court exercises broad discretion,
with rigid inquiry that restricts the exercise of judicial discretion. (R. 96.)

The trial court clearly expressed a powerless-

ness with respect to entertaining the reduction request, "the
standard that I'm required to consider . . . [is whether] there
is some basis that is required by the interest of justice." (R.
96.) It erred in its interpretation of its powers under the
statute, and it failed to recognize that it was not only
empowered, but required, to exercise broad discretion in the
matter.

Lipskv, 608 P.2d at 1244.

1. The Broad Discretion Standard Accommodates a General
Balancing of Factors.
Wright is not suggesting that the "interests-of-justice"
inquiry and judicial "discretion" are incompatible.

In other

matters, case law and statutory law allow the courts to exercise
"discretion" to further the "interests of justice." See Utah R.
Civ. P. 51 (1997) ("[T]he appellate court, in its discretion and
in the interests of justice may review the giving of or failure
to give an instruction"); Jensen v. Morgan, 844 P.2d 287, 292
(Utah 1992) (trial court in its discretion may allow pleading
amendments in the interests of justice under Utah R. Civ. P. 15);
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789 (Utah 1991).
In such cases, discretion mandates the broadest inquiry into
the nature of the challenged proceeding.
7

Appellate review of the

"very wide" discretionary standard results in reversal only if
there is evidence of abuse. State v. Houk, 906 P.2d 907, 909
(Utah App. 1995) (sentencing decisions reviewed for abuse of
discretion).

In this case, the trial court was required to

employ the "very wide discretion" standard.

Instead, it employed

an "interest-of-justice" inquiry that substantially restricted
the court in exercising its discretion, as set forth below.
2. Utah Appellate Courts Have Restricted the Interest-ofJustice Inquiry in Other Contexts, Which in Turn Restricts
the Trial Court's Exercise of Discretion in the Challenged
Proceeding.
In certain evidentiary matters the trial court is required
to determine whether the interests of justice "will
served"

by the court's ruling.

best

be

That inquiry requires the trial

court to engage in a specific analysis, limiting its discretion
and subjecting the ruling to a more critical review on appeal.
State v. Snvder, 932 P.2d 120, 125 (Utah App. 1997).
Specifically, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-411 (1995) provides that a
child victim's out-of-court statement regarding sexual abuse is
admissible as evidence, even if it does not qualify under an
existing hearsay exception, if inter

alia,

the judge determines

"the interest of justice will best be served by admission of that
statement."

Id.

The Utah Supreme Court has limited the trial

court's scope of analysis under that standard.
[T]he trial court must make an in-depth evaluation of the
proposed testimony as required by subsection 76-5-411(1).
This inquiry may require consideration of some matters not
specifically mentioned in the statute. For example, to
determine the reliability of the statement, a court should
consider how soon after the event it was given, whether the
statement was spontaneous, the questions asked to elicit it,
8

the number of times the statement was repeated or rehearsed,
and whether the statement is reproduced verbatim in court,
viz.,
tape recording, video tape, or otherwise. The trial
court should then enter findings and conclusions regarding
each of the factors listed in the statute to explain its
reasons for admitting or excluding the testimony.
State v. Nelson, 725 P.2d 1353, 1355 n. 3 (Utah 1986) (cites
omitted); Snyder, 932 P.2d at 132. The considerations placed on
the trial court in making its determination are rigid.
In another context, the court is required to consider
whether a challenged proceeding mandates a specific result in the
interest

of justice.

That is the standard the trial court

applied in Wright's case in determining whether it could enter an
order reducing Wright's sentence by one degree.

That standard is

employed to limit court discretion in the proceeding, as set
forth in the following cases.
In State v. Bell, 785 P.2d 390 (Utah 1989), the Utah Supreme
Court ruled that legislative enactments will not be stricken

"unless

the interests

of justice

require

the same because the law

is clearly in conflict with that set forth in the constitution.
Indeed, this Court has a duty to construe a statute whenever
possible so as to effectuate legislative intent and avoid and/or
save it from constitutional conflicts or infirmities." Id. at 397
(emphasis added; notes omitted); Zamora v. Draper, 635 P.2d 78,
80 (Utah 1981). In such cases, if the interest of justice
requires, the presumption of constitutionality is rebutted.

The

inquiry articulates a basis for finding an exception to a general
rule, or for rebutting a presumption.

9

Stated in terms of this case, assuming arguendo the trial
court was prohibited, as it articulated, from reducing a sentence
unless there was "some basis that [was] required by the interest
of justice," (R. 96) that standard suggests the presumption is
against reduction of the sentence unless the interests of justice
compel a different result. That standard is rigid and less
deferential to the trial court than the "very wide discretionary"
standard articulated in Lipsky for sentencing matters.
To further illustrate the point, in Anderson v. Public
Service Comm'n of Utah, 839 P.2d 822 (Utah 1992), the court
reiterated that "as a general rule, estoppel may not be invoked
against a government entity," except in "unusual circumstances

'where it is plain that the interests
Id. at 827 (emphasis added).

of justice

so

require.'11

Unusual circumstances compel an

exception to the general rule.

The exception applies "only if

'the facts may be found with such certainty, and the injustice
suffered is of sufficient gravity, to invoke the exception."
Id.; see also, Ehlers & Ehlers Architects v. Carbon County, 805
P.2d 789 (Utah App. 1991). Such a standard does not accommodate
the kind of "very wide" trial court discretion found in
sentencing.
The Utah Supreme Court's decision in State v. Casarez, 656
P.2d 1005 (Utah 1982), also illustrates the severity of the
inquiry applied by the trial court in this case.

In Casarez,

defendant challenged imposition of a sentence against him on the
basis that prior to sentencing, the state failed to give him
10

access to his presentence report as required by law.

Utah law

recognized that "'fundamental fairness' require[d] that a
defendant have the right to inspect" such a presentence report
"prior to sentencing so that a sentence [would] not be influenced
by inaccurate information." Id. at 1007.
The state argued that the statute governing disclosure of
such reports had been amended, justifying "the trial court's
discretionary

refusal

to give the defendant the presentence

report." Id. (emphasis added). According to the amended statute,
the court "may disclose all or parts of the [presentence] report
to the defendant or his counsel as
requires."

the

interest

of

justice

Id. (emphasis added). The Utah Supreme Court ruled

that the "interest of justice" provision must be construed to
create a very rare possibility, allowing the concealing of the
presentence report only when disclosure might lead to harm of a
third person.
That provision was not intended to make disclosure of a
presentence report depend on a personal whim or a
subjective standard of an individual judge. The interests at
stake are far too important for that. Rather, the
Legislature expressly provided that the exercise of
discretion should be guided as "the interest of justice
requires." Under that standard, it is the exceptional case
where full disclosure is not justified. Only when
disclosure of the presentence report would jeopardize the
life or safety of third parties, should there be deletions
from the report to protect them.
Id. at 1008. The court clarified that given the due process implications, the trial court would be required to disclose the
report except in specific circumstances.

The trial court's

statutory "discretion" in that instance was severely restricted
11

to specific considerations "as the interest of justice required."
Inasmuch as the trial court in this case stated that it was
"required to consider" whether there was some basis "required by
the interest of justice" for reducing Wright's sentence, the
trial court implicated a rigid inquiry that does not permit the
exercise of broad discretion. Such an inquiry does not apply in
the context of this case.

The trial court applied the wrong

standard to its determination. It should have exercised the "very
wide discretion" applicable to sentencing issues in this case.
In this matter, the state twice stipulated to a reduction in
sentencing.

(R. 69 and 96.) Because the parties cannot be sure

that the trial court would have rejected the stipulated motion if
it had properly exercised its discretion, the case should be
reversed and remanded with instructions that the trial court
properly consider the motion.
B. WRIGHT'S APPEAL DOES NOT IMPLICATE "PRESERVATION"
ISSUES.
In this case Wright requested that the trial court reduce
his conviction to the next lower category of offense.
97.)

(R. 85-

That is sufficient to preserve the issue concerning

improper sentencing.

See State v. Powell, 872 P.2d 1027, 1033

(Utah 1994) (defendant waived issue where he failed to request
that trial court reduce conviction to the "next lower category of
offense and impose sentence accordingly").
In the event this Court finds that the issue was not
properly preserved, notwithstanding the 12 pages of transcript
dedicated to the motion to reduce sentencing, Wright maintains
12

that the trial court's expression that it could not entertain the
issue without some basis "required by the interest of justice"
constitutes plain error.

Under the plain error doctrine, the

appellate court "balance[s] the need for procedural regularity
with the demands of fairness." State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155,
158 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 1024 (1990).
The doctrine considers whether the trial court failed to
engage in conduct that was required under the law in existence at
the time of the act in question. See State v. Labrum, 925 P.2d
937, 940 (Utah 1996).

At the time the trial court ruled on

Wright's motion to reduce his sentence by one degree, the trial
court obviously misconstrued its authority to exercise broad
discretion over the matter.
reasonable trial court.

The error would be obvious to the

Utah precedent on this subject is clear:

[The trial] court in fact has very wide discretion in
sentencing. A court may sentence a defendant to a prison
term, impose a fine, enter judgment
for a lower category
of
offense
vursuant
to § 76-3-402,
place him on probation,
disqualify him from public or private office pursuant to §
76-3-201, sentence the defendant to serve prison terms
concurrently or consecutively, order the defendant to pay
restitution, or suspend a prison sentence. As pointed out
in the dissent of Justice Wilkins in Reddish v. Smith,

supra, this wide variety
but absolutely
requires,

of alternatives
not only
permits,
the exercise of
discretion.

Lipskv, 608 P.2d at 1244 (emphasis added); Theison, 709 P.2d at
308 n.l; Brooks, 631 P.2d at 879; Harding 576 P.2d at 1284 n.3.
Failure to exercise "very wide discretion" over the matter should
be treated as plain error, since it is "absolutely require[d]"
under the case law. See State v. Labrum. 925 P.2d 937, 940 (Utah
1996) .
13

Further, in this case, the obvious error of expressing
powerlessness with respect to ruling on a sentencing issue serves
no conceivable strategic purpose.

Indeed, the state twice

stipulated to the entry of a reduced sentence, which was rejected
by the trial court because it mistakenly believed its powers in
considering the matter were limited.

Since the parties cannot be

sure that the trial court would have rejected the motion to
reduce Wright's sentence if the trial court had exercised its
discretion in the matter, the error was prejudicial.
"Because this case involves a sentencing error rather than a
trial error, the error is obvious on the face of the record and
undeniably prejudicial."

Labrum, 925 P.2d at 941.

The error was

a manifest violation of case law, it was plain and it was
harmful. The case should be remanded so that all parties involved
may have the benefit of the trial court's discretion in deciding
the matter.
CONCLUSION
Wright respectfully requests that the Court reverse the
judgment of the trial court and remand the case for further
proceedings.
SUBMITTED this

IH&

day of

CLU^L,

, 1997.

LINDA M. JONES
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

DEBORAH KREECK-MENDEZ
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

IN T H E T H I R D JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN A N D FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH.
JUDGMENT, SENTENCE
(COMMITMENT)

Plaintiff,

Case No, .....
Count No.
Honorable

VS.

BRANDON DAVID WRIGHT

P.lerk
RAprirtPr
Railiff

Date

Defendant.

9 6 1 9 0 1 5 5 3 FS
1 OF 1
TIMOTHY R. HANSON
E. THOMPSON
E. AMBROSE
J . WEISS
J A N . 3 , 1997

13 The motion of DEFT
to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
impose sentence accordingly is • granted 8 denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence
should not be imposed, and defendant having been convicted by D a jury; D the court; D plea of guilty;
D plea of no contest; of the offense of AGGRAVATFD RDRRFRY
a felony
of the J:
degree, D a class
misdemeanor, being now present in court and ready for sentence and
represented by KREECKMENDE^rl the State being represented by R MCCLOSKEX now adjudged guilty
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison:
D
D
D
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years and which may be for life;
to a maximum mandatory term of.
not to exceed five years;
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years;
of not less than five years and which may be for life;
not to exceed
years;
and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ ? n n n P I I K 8 5% SURCHARGE
and ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $
to
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D such sentence is to run concurrently witn
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D such sentence is to run consecutively with
D upon motion of D State, a Defense, a Court, Count(s) —

are hereby dismissed.

>£j RECOUPMENT ORDERED TO SALT LAKE COUNTY FOR LEGAL SERVICES IN AMOUNT OF $V
D Defendant is granted a stay of the above ( • prison) sentence and placed on probation in the
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult
Parole for the period of
, pursuant to the attachec^conditions of probation.
£3 Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake Coumy ^ for delivery to the Utah State
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail/where defendant shall be confined
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment.
fa Commitment shall issue
FORTHWITH.
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ADDENDUM B

PUNISHMENTS

76-3-402

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law
§ 552.
C.J.S. — 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law §§ 1522,
1523.

Key Numbers. — Criminal Law «=» 1210.

76-3-402. Conviction of lower degree of offense.
(1) If the court, having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense
of which the defendant was found guilty and to the history and character of the
defendant, concludes it would be unduly harsh to record the conviction as being
for that degree of offense established by statute and to sentence the defendant
to an alternative normally applicable to that offense, the court may unless
otherwise specifically provided by law enter a judgment of conviction for the
next lower degree of offense and impose sentence accordingly.
(2) If a conviction is for a third degree felony the conviction is considered to
be for a class A misdemeanor if:
(a) the judge designates the sentence to be for a class A misdemeanor
and the sentence imposed is within the limits provided by law for a class
A misdemeanor; or
(b) (i) the imposition of the sentence is stayed and the defendant is
placed on probation, whether committed to jail as a condition of
probation or not;
(ii) the defendant is subsequently discharged without violating his
probation; and
(iii) the judge upon motion and notice to the prosecuting attorney,
and a hearing if requested by either party or the court, finds it is in the
interest of justice that the conviction be considered to be for a class A
misdemeanor.
(3) An offense may be reduced only one degree under this section unless the
prosecutor specifically agrees in writing or on the court record that the offense
may be reduced two degrees. In no case may an offense be reduced under this
section by more than two degrees.
(4) This section may not be construed to preclude any person from obtaining
or being granted an expungement of his record as provided by law.
History: C. 1953, 76-3-402, enacted by L.
1973, ch. 196, § 76-3-402; 1983, ch. 88, § 6;
1991, ch. 7, § 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amendment, effective April 29,1991, twice substituted
"degree" for "category" in Subsection (1), inserted "third degree" and %lass A" in the introductory paragraph of^Subsection (2), twice inserted "class A m Subsection (2)(a), added the

subsection designations in Subsection (2)(b),
added Subsections (2)(b)(iii) and (3), redesignated former Subsection (3) as present Subsection (4), and made minor changes in punctuation and style throughout the section,
Cross-References. — Expungement and
s e a ling of records, § 77-18-9 et seq.; Rule
4 . 2 0 7 , Rules of Judicial Administration,
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Appeal.

When a conviction is reduced under this
section, the appeal lies in the court having
jurisdiction of the degree of crime recorded in
the judgment of conviction and for which defendant is sentenced, rather than the degree of
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